Publications

Menges, Leonhard (2026). “Nine Philosophical Questions About Privacy”, in Sven Nyholm, Atoosa Kasirzadeh, John Zerilli (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence.

Ventham, Elizabeth (2026). Beyond the Pendulum: The Best of Both Worlds in the Value of Privacy, A Reply to Becker. Philosophy and Technology 39 (18). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-026-01040-5

Ventham, Elizabeth & Sabrina Coninx (2026). “The Benefits of Ambivalence and the Context of Suicide Intervention”, in René Baston, Martin Weichold (eds.), Exploring Suicidal Ambivalence: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. New York: Routledge.

Eichhorn, Leonie (2026). Qualities of Will and Ambivalent Moral Worth. The Philosophical Quarterly 76 (1): 110-126. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae067

Seim, Maria (forthcoming). A Better Method for Blame: Functional and Paradigm-based accounts. Philosophy.

Ventham, Elizabeth (2025). Beyond the Social Value of Privacy. Philosophy and Technology 38 (158). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00982-6

Ventham, Elizabeth (online first). You Only Get Out what You Put In: A Defence of Subjective Normativity. Philosophy. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819125101009

Altehenger, Hannah & Leonhard Menges (2025). The Value of Climate Despair. Political Philosophy 2 (2): 473-495. doi: https://doi.org/10.16995/pp.19788

Ventham, Elizabeth (online first). Marko Jurjako: Normative Reasons from a Naturalistic Point of View. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-025-10497-w

Carey, Brian & Elizabeth Ventham (online first). There is no fresh air: A problem with the concept of echo chambers. Episteme. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2024.43

Weber-Guskar, Eva & Leonhard Menges (2025). Digital Emotion Detection, Privacy, and the Law. Philosophy and Technology 38 (2): 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00895-4

Menges, Leonhard (2025). Climate Change and State Interference: The Case of Privacy. Philosophical Studies 182 (2): 425-443. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02269-6

Ventham, Elizabeth (2025). Empathy, Motivating Reasons, and Morally Worthy Action. The Journal of Value Inquiry 59: 827-839. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-023-09972-3

Altehenger, Hannah & Leonhard Menges & Peter Schulte (2024). How AI Systems Can Be Blameworthy. Philosophia 4: 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00779-5

Menges, Leonhard (online first). The Right to Privacy and the Deep Self. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae091

Wang, Shawn (2024). Rethinking Functionalist Accounts of Blame. The Journal of Ethics 28: 607-623. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-023-09468-z

Ventham, Elizabeth (2024). Epathising in Online Spaces. Philosophical Explorations 27 (2): 225-236. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2024.2344980

Altehenger, Hannah & Leonhard Menges (2024). The Point of Blaming AI Systems. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 27 (2): 287-314. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v27i2.3060

Menges, Leonhard (2023). Blaming. In Maximilian Kiener (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Responsibility.

Ventham, Elizabeth (2023). Morality without Categoricity. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 19 (2): 4-23. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.19.2.4

Menges, Leonhard (2023). Responsibility, Free Will, and the Concept of Basic Desert. Philosophical Studies 180 (2): 615-636. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01912-4

Menges, Leonhard (2022). On the Top-Down Argument for the Ability to Do Otherwise. Erkenntnis 89: 2459-2472. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00638-3

Menges, Leonhard (2021). The Kind of Blame Skeptics Should be Skeptical About. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (6): 401-415. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2021.38